How generational stage affects agency conflict between family managers and family owners
ISSN: 1988-8767
Année de publication: 2014
Número: 743
Type: Working Paper
D'autres publications dans: Notas técnicas: [continuación de Documentos de Trabajo FUNCAS]
Résumé
This study compares the effects on firm returns of family managers� ownership and various governance mechanisms in family firms at different generational stages. We analyze a sample of unlisted Spanish family firms totally owned by a family and find that family managers� ownership benefits firm performance more in second-and-subsequent-generation firms than in first-generation ones. Direct control exercised by family owners over family managers also has a more intense influence on performance of second-and-following-generation firms; in contrast, the effect of family governance mechanisms (succession plans, family protocols, family councils) on firm performance is not related to the firm�s generational stage.