Los efectos de la participación bancaria en la política de inversión de las empresas españolasuna aplicación del modelo neoclásico de inversión

  1. Vicente Lorente, José David
  2. García Marco, Teresa
Revue:
Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

ISSN: 0210-2412

Année de publication: 1999

Número: 99

Pages: 325-348

Type: Article

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D'autres publications dans: Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

Résumé

In this paper we analyze the effects of banks as stakeholders on the investment policy of the firm. Fron an economic perspective, firms owned in some extent by its lenders should be able to avoid financial restrictions by reducing the informational asymmetry involved. As a result, the investing behavior of these firms should be closer to the predicted solution of a neoclassical model with perfect financial markets. In order to the test this hypothesis, we estimate a neoclassical model of investment using two subsamples of Spanish firms quoted in the "Bolsa de Madrid". Our results confirm that firms partially owned by banks are better represented by the neoclassical model tahn the subsample of firms without such charactetistic. These findings suggest taht banks are efficient stakeholders to reduce costs of informational asymmetry between firms and financial suppliers

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