The Demand for Individual Grievance Procedures in Germany and SpainLabour Law Changes versus Business Cycle

  1. Frick, Bernd
  2. Malo Ocaña, Miguel Ángel
  3. García Martínez, Pilar
  4. Schneider, Martin
Revista:
Estudios de economía aplicada

ISSN: 1133-3197,  1697-5731

Año de publicación: 2012

Título del ejemplar: Mercado de trabajo y crisis económica

Volumen: 30

Número: 1

Páginas: 283-310

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.25115/EEA.V30I1.3389 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Estudios de economía aplicada

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

En este artículo, se analizan los determinantes del número de procesos de despido individual improcedente. Los análisis econométricos realizados usando dos paneles equilibrados de datos de 11 estados de Alemania del Oeste (1964-2006) y 17 comunidades autónomas de España (1987-2006) muestran que algunas características del mercado de trabajo tales como la tasa de desempleo o la de vacantes tienen una influencia mayor en la demanda cíclica de reclamaciones individuales que los cambios en los derechos de los trabajadores. Así, el coste individual del desempleo predice mejor las reclamaciones por despido y salariales que los cambios institucionales que alteran los derechos de los trabajadores.

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