El efecto de los mecanismos internos de control en las operaciones con información privilegiada

  1. Tobar, José E.
  2. del Brío, Esther B.
  3. de Miguel, Alberto
Revista:
Estudios Gerenciales: Journal of Management and Economics for Iberoamerica

ISSN: 0123-5923

Año de publicación: 2017

Volumen: 33

Número: 144

Páginas: 228-239

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.ESTGER.2017.07.002 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Estudios Gerenciales: Journal of Management and Economics for Iberoamerica

Resumen

Este trabajo analiza el uso de la información privilegiada en las operaciones de compra de los insiders españoles y de cómo la estructura de propiedad afecta su comportamiento transaccional. Para ello se realizó un estudio empírico con una muestra de 2.233 operaciones de compra. Respecto al cálculo de los retornos anormales se aplicó la metodología de estudio de eventos, mientras que para el análisis del efecto de la estructura de propiedad se utilizaron regresiones lineales múltiples. Los resultados aportan evidencia sobre la coexistencia de los efectos de control y expropiación de la concentración de propiedad, de la coexistencia de los efectos de convergencia y atrincheramiento de la propiedad de los insiders y del efecto del tipo de accionista sobre los retornos anormales.

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