Bargaining sets in finite economies

  1. Carlos Hervés-Beloso 1
  2. Javier Hervés-Estévez 1
  3. Emma Moreno-García 2
  1. 1 Universidade de Vigo
    info

    Universidade de Vigo

    Vigo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05rdf8595

  2. 2 Universidad de Salamanca
    info

    Universidad de Salamanca

    Salamanca, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02f40zc51

Revista:
Working paper series ( RGEA )

Año de publicación: 2017

Número: 5

Tipo: Documento de Trabajo

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Resumen

We provide a notion of bargaining set for a finite production economy based on a two-step veto mechanism `a la Aubin (1979). We show that this bargaining set and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide. At the light of our result we refine Mas-Colell’s bargaining set for replicas of a finite economy. Our main result shows the persistence of Anderson et al. (1997) non-convergence of the bargaining sets to the set of Walrasian allocations. In addition, we analyze how the restriction on the formation of coalitions affects the bargaining set.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet