New indexes for measuring electoral disproportionality

  1. VERÓNICA ARREDONDO 1
  2. MIGUEL MARTÍNEZ-PANERO 2
  3. ANTONIO PALOMARES 3
  4. TERESA PEÑA 2
  5. VICTORIANO RAMÍREZ 3
  1. 1 Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas
    info

    Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas

    Zacatecas, México

    ROR https://ror.org/01m296r74

  2. 2 Universidad de Valladolid
    info

    Universidad de Valladolid

    Valladolid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01fvbaw18

  3. 3 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

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Revista:
Rect@: Revista Electrónica de Comunicaciones y Trabajos de ASEPUMA

ISSN: 1575-605X

Ano de publicación: 2020

Volume: 21

Número: 2

Páxinas: 161-178

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.24309/RECTA.2020.21.2.05 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Outras publicacións en: Rect@: Revista Electrónica de Comunicaciones y Trabajos de ASEPUMA

Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

Resumo

The number of representatives obtained by each political party in an electoral process must be a whole number. So, the percentage of votes for each party usually differs from the corresponding percentage of seats, forcing a certain unavoidable disproportionality. On the other hand, different elements of the electoral system (constituencies, thresholds, etc.) may produce some avoidable disproportionality. Those indexes traditionally used to analyse disproportionality take into account an unreachable exact proportionality as a reference. Instead, our more realistic approach quantifies distortions from a specific allotment, namely the seat distribution obtained when applying a proportional method to the total votes (that is, as if it were a unique constituency, without electoral thresholds or incentives to the winning party). Hence, we measure the avoidable disproportionality associated with such method. Unlike traditional indexes, we propose indexes associated with proportional allotment methods that can be zero in real situations. They are simple to calculate and allow us to decipher the number of seats assigned beyond the inevitable disproportionality which arises from the constraint of whole numbers. We are particularly interested in the indexes associated with Jefferson and Webster methods, which are compared to Gallagher, Loosemore-Hanby and SainteLaguë indexes for the results of 55 elections held in several countries.

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet