Resiliencia contablegobierno corporativo y transparencia bancaria

  1. Félix J. López-Iturriaga 1
  2. Jorge Gallud Cano 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Valladolid
    info

    Universidad de Valladolid

    Valladolid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01fvbaw18

Revista:
Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación. CEF

ISSN: 2695-6896,  2792-8306

Año de publicación: 2022

Número: 466

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación. CEF

Resumen

The last two crises have shown two different sides of the banking system: while the financial crisis of 2008 revealed its vulnerability to excessive risk-taking policies, during the current pandemic banks are revealing courageous to mitigate the devas-tating economic effects, despite the risk that this policy entails. However, in both cases there is an underlying question of how to make the information provided by banks more transparent. In this paper we contrast the relationship between the structure of the board of directors and accounting disclosure (understood as recognition of risk through loan loss provisions) through a sample of 1,352 banks from 52 countries between 2000 and 2019. We obtain an inverse U-shaped rela-tionship with the size of the board, consistent with the idea of an optimal number of directors. Likewise, we find a positive influence of board independence, tenure, and diversity (in terms of female presence).

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